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Abstract
We investigate the long-run eect of energy conservation regulation, which forces
rms to raise energy-saving investment above the cost-minimising level (i.e. the
business-as-usual level). If Pigovian tax is imposed, additional regulation always harms
social welfare under perfect competition. However, under imperfect competition, ad-
ditional regulation can improve welfare even if Pigovian tax is imposed. Thus, under
imperfect competition, there is a rationale for additional energy conservation regula-
tion even in the presence of Pigovian tax. Our result under imperfect competition
holds regardless of whether strategies are strategic substitutes or complements in con-
trast to direct entry regulation.
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Highlights
We investigate the long-run eect of energy conservation regulation.
We consider the cases in which Pigovian tax is imposed.
Additional energy conservation regulation is always harmful under perfect competition.
It may improve both social and consumer welfare under imperfect competition.
2
1 Introduction
In many countries, environmental and/or energy consumption taxes are imposed to inter-
nalise the negative externality of energy consumption.1 Nevertheless, additional regulations
that aim to improve the eciency of energy consumption exist globally. In Japan, following
the Act of the Rational Use of Energy, which was originally enacted in 1979 and has been
repeatedly amended, the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry sets industry-specic
targets for the improvement of energy eciency and regulates energy eciency levels. More-
over, the Ministry of the Environment imposes energy eciency regulation on power plants
in addition to regulating the emissions of pollutants. Similar regulations exist outside Japan,
such as in the United States (Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 1975, National Appli-
ance Energy Conservation Act, 1987, Energy Policy Act, 2005), Germany (EnEV, 1977),
Singapore (Energy Conservation Act, 2012), and Thailand (The Ministerial Regulation B.E.
2547, 2004).
In this study, we consider the situation in which Pigovian tax is imposed and thus the
negative externality has already been fully internalised. Pigovian tax is an eective tool
for internalising the negative externality of energy consumption.2 However, we examine
1For example, in Japan, gasoline tax is Y= 53.8 per litre, coal tax is Y= 1,370 per ton, and electric power
consumption tax is Y= 355 per MWh. Norway, Sweden, Denmark, France, and Portugal introduced carbon
taxes in 1991, 1991, 1992, 2014, and 2015, respectively in addition to energy taxes. In France, carbon tax
is e22 per ton, which will be raised to e100 by 2030. In Portugal, carbon tax is e6.67 per ton. South
Africa and Chile plan to introduce carbon taxes in 2017. The United Kingdom and Germany have energy
taxes. The tax rates of gasoline in all the European countries mentioned above are higher than those in
Japan and the tax rates of coal consumption are also higher, except for Germany. The United States also
has energy taxes; however, the tax rates of gasoline and coal are lower than those in Japan (Ministry of the
Environment, Government of Japan, 2016).
2Under perfect competition, Pigovian tax is optimal both in the short-run case (in a market with a
xed number of rms) and in the long-run case (in a market where the number of rms is determined by
the zero-prot condition). Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas (1995), Lee (1999), and Requate (1997) showed
that Pigovian tax can be optimal (e.g. demand is linear) even under long-run imperfect competition. For a
discussion of the long-run optimal environmental tax rate under imperfect competition, see also Cato (2010)
and Lahiri and Ono (2007).
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whether there is a rationale for energy conservation regulation even in the presence of Pigo-
vian tax and make two main ndings. On one hand, under perfect competition, additional
energy conservation regulation harms consumer and social welfare in the long run. On the
other, under imperfect competition, additional energy conservation regulation can improve
both consumer and social welfare, even in the long run. Our result suggests that under
imperfect competition, energy conservation regulation may be useful even when the govern-
ment imposes Pigovian tax. We also show that our result holds when the tax rate is below
the Pigovian level unless the tax rate falls too low.
Energy conservation regulation has two main advantages over direct entry regulation,
as discussed by Mankiw and Whinston (1986) and Suzumura and Kiyono (1987).3 First,
energy conservation regulation increases both the total social surplus and consumer wel-
fare, while direct entry regulation increases the total social surplus but reduces consumer
welfare.4 Second, energy conservation regulation increases both the total social surplus and
consumer welfare regardless of whether the strategies in the quantity competition stage are
substitutes or complements, while direct regulation increases the total social surplus only
when strategies are strategic substitutes.
2 The Model
In the model presented herein, there are innitely many potential new entrants, each of
which has an energy consumption function y = g(x; I) : R2+ 7! R+, where y 2 R+ is the
energy consumption level, x 2 R+ is the output level, and I 2 R+ is the energy conser-
vation investment level. Energy conservation investment is assumed to improve marginal
energy consumption eciency. We assume that g(x; I) is twice continuously dierentiable,
3The long-run eects of various policies are intensively discussed by Cato and Matsumura (2013), Etro
(2004, 2007), and Lahiri and Ono (1995, 1998).
4This property is shared by Lahiri and Ono (1988), who showed another version of excessive entry.
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gx > 0; gxx > 0; gxI < 0, and gII > 0 8x > 0 (the subscript denotes the derivative, for
example, gx = @f=@x and gxx = @
2f=@x2). The assumption gx > 0 implies that higher
production requires higher energy consumption. The assumptions gxx > 0 and gII > 0 are
made to ensure that the prot function is concave. The assumption gxI < 0 implies that
energy conservation investment reduces marginal energy consumption and thus reduces the
marginal production cost. This is the critical assumption in our analysis.
Let n ( 1) be the number of entering rms and X := Pni=1 xi be total output in the
market. The (inverse) demand function is given by p(X) : R+ 7! R+. We assume that p(X)
is nonincreasing and twice dierentiable. We also assume that p0(X) < 0 for all X as long
as p > 0. One unit of energy consumption yields d > 0 units of the negative externality.5
Firm i's prot i is p(X)xi   (w + t)yi   Ii, where w > 0 is the energy price and t is
energy consumption tax. We assume that w is given exogenously. We also assume that
demand is suciently large that n  1 holds in all relevant subgames in free entry markets.
The total social surplus is given by
W =
Z X
0
p(q)dq   (w + d)
nX
i=1
yi  
nX
i=1
Ii: (1)
The game runs as follows. Before the game, the government chooses the minimal level
of investment I as its energy conservation regulation. In the rst stage, by observing
I, potential new entrants choose whether to enter the market. In the second stage, after
observing the number of new entrants n, each new entrant i (i = 1:::; n) independently
chooses xi and Ii under the constraint Ii  I. We restrict our attention to the symmetric
equilibrium at which all rms entering the market choose the same x and I.
5Some readers might think that d should be increasing in total energy consumption Y :=
Pn
i=1 yi. We
consider the case in which few other industries consume energy and thereby yield negative externalities.
Further, the eect of the marginal damage to energy consumption by an industry is insignicant. We show
that our results hold even when d is increasing in Y at the cost of some notations.
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3 The Results
In this section, we discuss the case in which the government sets t = d. In other words, the
negative externality of energy consumption is fully internalised.
3.1 Benchmark: perfect competition case
In this subsection, we consider the case in which all rms are price takers in the product
market. Suppose that I is small and the constraint Ii  I is not binding. In the second
stage, n-symmetric rms choose x and I to maximise their prots. We assume jgxxgII j >
(gxI)
2 to ensure that i(x; I) is concave. The rst-order conditions are
p = (w + t)gx; (2)
 (w + t)gI = 1: (3)
Let IN be the investment level at which the constraint Ii  I is not binding. If Ii  IN ,
each rm chooses I = IN ; otherwise, each rm chooses I = I.
In the rst stage, innitely many potential new entrants decide whether to enter the
market. The number of entrants n is given by the zero-prot condition:
px  (w + t)y   I = 0: (4)
If the minimal investment regulation is eective (i.e. the constraint I  I is binding),
equations (2) and (4) determine n and x given I = I. On the contrary, equations (2){
(4) determine n; x, and I when no eective regulation exists. Henceforth, we restrict our
attention to the case in which the regulation is eective.
We use the superscript TP to denote the equilibrium outcome in the subgame, where
superscript `T' denotes `price taker' and `P' denotes Pigovian tax. We present the results
on the relationship between I and the equilibrium outcomes.
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Lemma 1 Suppose that the constraint I  I is binding. Under perfect competition, (i)
nTP is strictly decreasing in I, (ii) xTP is strictly increasing in I, (iii) pTP is increasing
in I, and (iv) W TP is decreasing in I.
Proof See the Appendix.
We now emphasise that (iii) does not hold in the short run (when the number of rms
is given exogenously). A higher I lowers the marginal cost of rms and reduces the price,
resulting in a gain for consumers. However, this benecial price reduction for consumers is
unsustainable. A higher I raises the costs of rms and induces their exits from the market,
resulting in a higher price in the long run.
When the negative externality of energy consumption is fully internalised under perfect
competition, additional regulation that requires a larger investment level than the cost-
minimising one reduces production eciency. Thus, it is harmful for both consumer welfare
and social welfare from the long-run viewpoint. However, this is not true under imperfect
competition.
3.2 Imperfect competition case
In this subsection, we consider the case in which rms are price makers in the product
market. Suppose that I is small and the constraint Ii  I is not binding. In the second
stage, n-symmetric rms choose xi to maximise their prots. We assume that
2p0 + p00x  (w + t)gxx < 0; (5)
 (2p0 + p00x  (w + t)gxx)gII > (w + t)(gxI)2 (6)
to ensure that (x; I) is concave. A sucient condition for (5) is p0 + p00x < 0 (strategic
substitutes). Another sucient condition is gxx is suciently large or jp0j is suciently large
relative to jp00j and this is also a sucient condition for (6). Thus, our analysis can apply
to strategic complement cases as long as (5) and (6) are satised.
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The rst-order condition for x is
p+ p0x = (w + t)gx: (7)
The rst-order condition for I is identical to the case of perfect competition.
In the rst stage, innitely many potential new entrants decide whether to enter the
market. The number of entrants n is given by the zero-prot condition (4). The superscript
MP denotes the equilibrium outcome in the game, where `M' denotes `price maker' in the
product market and `P' denotes Pigovian tax. We present our main result as follows.
Proposition 1 Suppose that the constraint I  I is binding. Under imperfect competition,
a marginal rise in I from the non-binding level IN increases WMP .
Proof
dW
dI

I=IN
=
dn
dI
(px  (w + d)g   I) + ndx
dI
(p  (w + d)gx)  n((w + d)gI + 1) (8)
= n
dx
dI
(p  (w + d)gx) (9)
where we use t = d, equation (4) (the rst term in (8) is zero), and equation (3) (the third
term in (8) is zero). From (7), we obtain p  (w + d)gx > 0. Under these conditions, (9) is
positive if and only if dx=dI > 0.
By dierentiating (7) and (4), we obtain
np0 + nxp00 + p0   (w + t)gxx x(p0 + xp00)
nxp0 + p  (w + t)gx x2p0

dx
dn

=

(w + t)gxI
(w + t)gI + 1

dI: (10)
By using (7) we obtain
np0 + nxp00 + p0   (w + t)gxx x(p0 + xp00)
(n  1)xp0 x2p0

dx
dn

=

(w + t)gxI
(w + t)gI + 1

dI: (11)
By applying Cramer's rule to (11), we obtain
dx
dI
=
(w + t)gxIx
2p0   ((w + t)gI + 1)x(p0 + xp00)
x2p0(2p0 + xp00   (w + t)gxx) : (12)
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From (3), we obtain (w + t)gI + 1 = 0 when I = I
N . Thus,
dx
dI

I=IN
=
(w + t)gxIx
2p0
x2p0(2p0 + xp00   (w + t)gxx) : (13)
From (5), we nd that the denominator in (13) is positive. The numerator in (13) is positive
because gxI < 0 and p
0 < 0. These lead to Proposition 1. Q.E.D.
Proposition 1 states that under imperfect competition, additional regulation that induces
further energy conservation investments can improve welfare, even when Pigovian tax is
imposed. Thus, energy conservation regulation can be a reasonable policy tool in such a
market. Note that because the prots of rms are zero and tax revenue is equal to the loss
caused by the negative externality, the total social surplus is equal to the consumer surplus.
Thus, Proposition 1 implies that a marginal rise in I increases the consumer surplus (i.e.
it reduces pMP ), which is in stark contrast to the case of perfect competition (Lemma 1).
An increase in I has three eects. First, it increases the investment cost and raises the
entry cost for each new entrant, which thus reduces the number of entering rms. However,
since Pigovian tax fully internalises social costs, zero prot means that a marginal change
in the number of rms is irrelevant for social welfare given the output of each rm, x.
Therefore, the rst term in (8) is zero. Second, a rise in I increases the output of each rm
because it reduces the marginal production cost. Because the output of each rm is too
small for social welfare under imperfect competition, it improves welfare (i.e. the second
term in (8) is positive). Third, an increase in I raises the total cost (production cost plus
investment cost) of each rm and reduces eciency. However, this welfare-reducing eect
of the marginal increase in the energy-saving investment from the cost-minimising level
is second order (envelope theorem), and thus the third term in (8) is zero. Therefore, a
marginal increase in I from the cost-minimising level always improves welfare.
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Next, we briey discuss what happens when the tax rate is below the Pigovian tax level.6
Suppose that the tax rate is below the Pigovian tax level. Then, the rst term in (8) is not
zero. By applying Cramer's rule to (11), we obtain
dn
dI

I=IN
=   (n  1)xp
0(w + t)gxI
x2(p0)2   (w + t)gxxx2p0 + x2p0(p0 + xp00) < 0: (14)
Because px  (w+ d)g  I < px  (w+ t)g  I = 0, the rst term in (8) is positive. In other
words, when the tax rate is below the Pigovian tax level, an additional welfare-improving
eect of an increase in I exists, because the decrease in the number of entering rms directly
improves welfare. Thus, as long as p   (w + d)gx  0, Proposition 1 holds even when the
tax rate is below the Pigovian tax level. However, if the tax rate is too low, the second term
in (8) can be negative and thus the sign of (8) is ambiguous.7
Some readers might suspect that our analysis is simply a variant of the excess entry theo-
rem shown by Mankiw and Whinston (1986) and Suzumura and Kiyono (1987), considering
that an increase in xed cost I is essential and that energy conservation regulation is not es-
sential. They might guess that an increase in I directly reduces the number of entering rms
and improves welfare. However, this is not correct. Suppose that g(x; I) = ga(x) + gb(I)
and gb(I) is decreasing. In this setting, all assumptions except for the assumption gxI < 0
can be satised. In this case, gxI = 0, and thus a marginal increase in I
 from IN does
not aect x and n. Therefore, Proposition 1 does not hold. Thus, the assumption gxI < 0
(additional regulation increases investment costs but reduces marginal costs) is essential in
our analysis.
6The environmental tax rate is often below the Pigovian tax level. See Sen et al. (2010) and Mizutani et
al. (2011), who discussed gasoline taxes in India and Japan, respectively. In addition, in the short-run case,
the government has an incentive to set a tax rate below the Pigovian tax level under imperfect competition,
as long as rms are symmetric. See Levin (1985) and Requate (1993).
7Suppose that p = a X, g(x; I) = k(I)x2; k0 < 0 and k00 > 0. We can show that (8) is in fact negative
if d is large and t is small.
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To further clarify the dierence between our result and the excess entry theorem, we
briey discuss what happens if the government controls the number of entering rms directly.
Suppose that Pigovian tax is imposed.
Let x(n) and I(n) be the output of each rm and investment level at the symmetric
equilibrium. From (3) and (7), we obtain
(n+ 1)p0 + p00x  (w + t)gxx  (w + t)gxI
(w + t)gxI (w + t)gII

dx
dI

=  

x(p0 + p00x)
0

dn: (15)
By applying Cramer's rule to (15), we obtain
dx
dn
=
 x(p0 + p00x)(w + t)gII
((n+ 1)p0 + p00x  (w + t)gxx)(w + t)gII + (w + t)2(gxI)2 ; (16)
dI
dn
=
x(p0 + p00x)(w + t)gxI
((n+ 1)p0 + p00x  (w + t)gxx)(w + t)gII + (w + t)2(gxI)2 : (17)
From (6), we nd that the common denominator in (16) is negative. The numerators in (16)
and (17) are positive if and only if p0 + p00x < 0 (i.e. strategies are strategic substitutes).
Let W (n) be the welfare function given by
W (n) =
Z nx(n)
0
p  n((w + d)g + I(n)): (18)
Let nF be the number of entering rms at the free entry equilibrium:
dW
dn

n=nF
= (x+ nx0)p  (w + d)g   I   n(w + d)gxx0   I 0(n)((w + d)gI + 1)
= nx0(p  (w + d)gx); (19)
where we use px  (w + d)g   I = 0 when n = nF and (w + d)gI + 1 = 0. Note that d = t.
Therefore, (19) is negative, and thus the number of entering rms is excessive for social
welfare if and only if p0 + p00x < 0 (i.e. strategies are strategic substitutes), as shown by
Mankiw and Whinston (1986) and Suzumura and Kiyono (1987). This nding implies that
directly regulating the number of entering rms may also improve welfare.
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However, we emphasise two important dierences between direct entry regulation and
energy conservation regulation. First, Mankiw and Whinston (1986) and Suzumura and
Kiyono (1987) showed that reducing the number of rms may improve welfare but that it also
reduces the consumer surplus. By contrast, additional energy-saving regulation increases
both the total social surplus and the consumer surplus. Next, energy-saving regulation
improves welfare even when strategies are strategic complements.8
4 Concluding remarks
In this study, we investigate regulation that induces larger energy-saving investment. Under
perfect competition, when Pigovian tax is introduced, additional energy-saving regulation
that forces rms to invest more in energy-saving activities than the cost-minimising level
(i.e. the business-as-usual level) increases the total costs of rms and reduces both the
total social surplus and the consumer surplus in the long run. However, larger energy-
saving investment reduces energy consumption costs, accelerates competition, and yields
additional welfare gains under imperfect competition, even in the long run. We thus show
that even if Pigovian tax is imposed, additional energy consumption regulation increases
both the total social surplus and the consumer surplus in the long run. However, if the
emission tax is low and negative externality of emissions is signicant, additional energy
consumption regulation may reduce the total social surplus. In this sense, environmental
tax policy and energy-saving regulation can be complements rather than substitutes.
8Another advantage of energy conservation regulation over direct entry regulation should be mentioned
here. In this study as well as in the literature on the excess entry theorem, we assume that all potential new
entrants are identical. This may be rationalised in free entry markets because inecient potential entrants
cannot enter the market because of their competitive disadvantage. However, direct entry regulation may
allow less ecient entrants to enter the market. Moreover, the government knowing the equilibrium number
of rms without regulation is more dicult than knowing the cost-minimising investment level. Suppose
that demand is linear, given by p = a   X. To derive the equilibrium number in free entry markets, the
government needs to know the value of the demand parameter a; moreover, to derive the cost-minimising
investment level, the government need not know this information.
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However, regulation targeting lower emissions without reducing energy consumption,
such as that encouraging carbon dioxide capture and storage, may increase energy consump-
tion and marginal costs; thus, our analysis does not apply to such regulation. Expanding
the scope of our ndings to cover both non-energy consumption and energy consumption
environmental regulations would therefore be an interesting future research topic.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1(i)
By dierentiating (2) and (3), we obtain
np0   (w + t)gxx xp0
nxp0 + p  (w + t)gx x2p0

dx
dn

=

(w + t)gxI
(w + t)gI + 1

dI: (20)
From (2), this is rewritten as
np0   (w + t)gxx xp0
nxp0 x2p0

dx
dn

=

(w + t)gxI
(w + t)gI + 1

dI: (21)
Applying Cramer's rule to (21),
dn
dI
=
 np0( (w + t)gI   1) + (w + t)gxx( (w + t)gI   1)  nx(w + t)p0gxI
 x2p0(w + t)gxx : (22)
Note that since I  IN ,  (w + t)gI   1  0. Therefore, the numerator of (15) is negative
and the denominator of (15) is positive. Thus, dn=dI < 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 1(ii)
Applying Cramer's rule to (21),
dx
dI
=
(w + t)x2p0gxI + xp0( (w + t)gI   1)
 x2p0(w + t)gxx : (23)
Because  (w + t)gI   1  0, both the denominator and the numerator of (16) are positive.
Thus, dx=dI > 0: Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 1(iii)
dp
dI
= (x
dn
dI
+ n
dx
dI
)p0 (24)
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Substituting (15) and (16) into (17),
dp
dI
=
[(w + t)xgxx( (w + t)gI   1)]
 x2p0(w + t)gxx p
0  0 (25)
since  (w + t)gI   1  0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 1(iv)
dW
dI
=
dn
dI
(px  (w + d)g   I) + n dx
dI
(p  (w + d)gx)  n((w + d)gI + 1)
=  n((w + d)gI + 1)  0 (26)
where the second equality comes from d = t, (2), and (3). The inequality follows because
 (w + t)gI   1  0. Q.E.D.
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